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Article I, section 20 of the Washington Constitution states that
"[a]ll persons charged with crimes shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident, or the
presumption great." '  Despite seemingly unequivocal language that
this constitutional provision is applicable to "all persons," the
Washington Supreme Court, in Estes v. Hopp,2 declared that juveniles
do not have a constitutional right to bail.3 The Estes court engaged
in little constitutional analysis, but instead, reasoned that juvenile
proceedings are civil in nature and that article 1, section 20 applies
only in criminal proceedings.4
Central to the Estes court's determination was the parens patriae
system of juvenile justice5 that existed in Washington State at the time
of the decision. The parens patriae system emphasizes rehabilitation
rather than punishment and gives judges broad discretion to act in the
best interests of the child. Under this system, juveniles are protected
and sheltered by the state, which theoretically molds them into
responsible citizens.6 When the Estes decision was handed down in
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1. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 20.
2. 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968).
3. Id. at 269, 438 P.2d at 208; see also State ex rel. Gray v. Webster, 122 Wash. 526, 530,
211 P. 274, 275 (1922).
4. 73 Wash. 2d at 269, 438 P.2d at 208.
5. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 12-19.
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1968, Washington, like every other state, had clearly embraced the
parens patriae concept of juvenile justice.
However, in the twenty-seven years since Estes, Washington's
juvenile justice system has undergone a radical transformation. In
1977, Washington adopted a system based primarily on punishment
and accountability in contrast to the prior system based on rehabilita-
tion.7 This Comment argues that because Washington has essentially
rejected the parens patriae approach to juvenile justice in favor of a
punitive approach, juveniles should be given the same right to bail as
their adult counterparts.
Section II of this Comment provides an overview of the historical
development of juvenile justice in the United States. Section III
examines the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of article I,
section 20 in Estes v. Hopp and examines cases from other states in
which juveniles' constitutional right to bail has been assessed. This
examination is followed in Section IV by a discussion of the transfor-
mation that has occurred in Washington since the Estes decision.
Finally, Section V explains why, as Washington's juvenile justice
system shifts its focus from rehabilitation toward punishment, juveniles
should have the same right to bail as adult criminal defendants.
II. THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
A. The Development of the Juvenile Courts and the Institutional-
ization of the Parens Patriae Approach to Juvenile Justice
In criminal proceedings at common law, no distinction was made
between an adult and a child who had reached the age of criminal
responsibility.' Punishment, not rehabilitation, was the underlying
philosophy, as juveniles were often given harsh sentences and confined
in adult institutions.' However, beginning in 1787, religious groups
and private welfare organizations attempted to reform the appalling
conditions faced by both juvenile and adult prisoners. These groups
began to provide social services for the growing number of unsuper-
7. See infra section IV.A.
8. IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 150 (1989); see, e.g., DEAN J. CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM:
DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING, AND THE LAW 7-10 (1992). At common law, only children seven
years of age or older were subject to the criminal courts because those under the age of seven were
deemed incapable of possessing criminal intent. Id. at 15-17. Under most statutory schemes
today, the juvenile courts have jurisdiction over all children under the age of eighteen. Id. In
Washington, a juvenile is defined as "any individual who is under the chronological age of
eighteen years .... " WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.020(14) (1994).
9. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 150.
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vised and troubled youth flooding into industrialized, urban areas."0
As the influence of these private welfare organizations grew, states
began to regulate and control the privately funded programs and
facilities, thereby bringing an increasing number of delinquent and
dependent children under state influence and control."
By the late nineteenth century, the social reform movement
focused on the complete removal of children from adult jails and lock-
ups.'" Guiding these reform efforts was the belief that children are
not responsible for their actions, and therefore, they should not receive
the punitive treatment accorded adult prisoners.' Because the
reformers believed that children were redeemable, they sought to
insulate children from the brutalities of adult prison life and stem the
tide of future criminal activity. 4
These early reform efforts led to the creation of the first juvenile
court in 18995 and the institutionalization of the parens patriae16
doctrine as a justification for state control over delinquent youths.17
The parens patriae approach to juvenile justice focuses on the welfare
of the child by creating a benevolent and protective relationship
between the state and the delinquent child.'" Parens patriae juvenile
courts reject the formal, adversarial processes of adult criminal
proceedings in favor of informal and flexible processes in which judges
have broad discretion to act in the "best interests of the child."' 9
Rehabilitation, not punishment, is the primary goal. By 1917, all but
three states had instituted a separate juvenile court.20 Today, the
separate system of juvenile justice is firmly entrenched in all fifty states
and the District of Columbia.2
10. CHAMPION, supra note 8, at 10-11.
11. Id. at 11.
12. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REMOVAL OF JUVENILES FROM
ADULT JAILS AND LOCK-UPS: A REVIEW OF STATE APPROACHES AND POLICY IMPLICA-
TIONS 3-4 (1981).
13. Id. at 4.
14. Id.
15. CHAMPION, supra note 8, at 13, 250.
16. Parens patriae is a concept derived from the twelfth century English monarchy that
literally means "father of the country." Id. at 18. At English common law, a child over the age
of seven who violated the law became accountable to the King. Id. On behalf of the King, the
chancellor adjudicated juvenile matters and ultimately became responsible for safeguarding the
welfare of children who came within the jurisdiction of the court. Id.
17. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 150-51.
18. CHAMPION, supra note 8, at 307.
19. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 150.
20. Id.
21. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructuring the Legal Order: The
Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1083 (1991).
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B. The Second Call for Juvenile Justice Reform: The Dawning of the
Due Process Model
Despite the benevolent philosophy underlying the creation of
separate juvenile courts, by the 1960s many began to question whether
the system was truly operating in the best interests of the child.22
Parents of juvenile offenders and members of the public became
increasingly concerned about the broad discretion given to judges
under the parens patriae system.23 The absence of consistent guide-
lines inherent in the case-by-case approach to juvenile adjudication
resulted in "frequent and obvious abuses of judicial discretion. '"24 In
addition, because juvenile proceedings were deemed civil, not criminal,
in nature, children were denied certain basic constitutional protections
enjoyed by adult criminal defendants.2"
In 1960, the Director of Detention Services for the National
Probation and Parole Association noted that after sixty years of reform,"children are still held in jails or jail-like facilities."2b According to
the director, the traditional purpose of detention was to warehouse
children in secure custody until the court had time to investigate and
act.17  Most of the jails and police lock-ups where children were
detained failed to meet even the minimum standards required for adult
institutions. In 1966, the plight of the juvenile courts led the
United States Supreme Court to declare that a child charged with a
crime may be receiving the "worst of both worlds: ... he gets neither
the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenera-
tive treatment postulated for children."29
22. See CHAMPION, supra note 8, at 306.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967). In Gault, a 15-year-old boy was
sentenced to six years confinement in a state industrial school after a juvenile court judge
concluded that he had made an obscene phone call. Although Gault's parents were notified that
a delinquency hearing would be held, neither Gault nor his parents were advised of the specific
charges against him or told that the boy could be represented by counsel. Gault was held in a
detention facility for three to four days without explanation, despite the fact that both of Gault's
parents were active participants in the court proceedings. At the hearing, Gault did not have an
attorney and was found guilty based upon the testimony of his accuser, who was not present. In
addition, the statements that Gault made during a police interrogation were used against him.
Id. at 7-10.
25. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
26. SHERWOOD NORMAN, DETENTION PRACTICE: SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE DETENTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH 1 (1960).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
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Prompted by these concerns, in 1967 the Supreme Court formally
recognized the constitutional rights of delinquent children in the
landmark case of In re Gault.3" In Gault, the Court concluded that"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."'" Thus, in judicial proceedings, due process requires that
juveniles be given the right to notification of charges, the right to
counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the
privilege against self-incrimination.32 Although the Gault Court did
not address whether juveniles were entitled to bail, the Court recog-
nized that the parens patriae juvenile court system had been used as a
justification for the denial of this right." But, despite the Court's
skepticism of the constitutional and theoretical bases for the separate
juvenile system,34 it stopped short of holding the parens patriae
approach unconstitutional.
Some advocates feared that constitutional protections for juveniles
would frustrate parens patriae objectives by creating a formalistic and
adversarial environment.3" However, Justice Fortas noted that "the
observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly
administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of
the substantive benefits of the juvenile process."36 Thus, after Gault,
a new era in juvenile justice seemed to be dawning under a "due
process model," characterized by more formalized processes and
concern for juveniles' rights at every stage of the proceedings.37
During the 1970s, the Court extended constitutional protections by
recognizing the right to proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" in
delinquency adjudications38 and granting double jeopardy protection
to juveniles. 9
Yet, despite the Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with the flexible
parens patriae approach, the due process model has not been fully
realized. Instead, the Court has continued to base decisions on what
it characterizes as the unique, informal nature of the juvenile system.
For example, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,4" the Court denied the
30. 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967).
31. Id. at 13.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 14.
34. Id. at 17-31.
35. See id. at 21-23.
36. Id. at 21.
37. CHAMPION, supra note 8, at 183-84, 307.
38. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1969).
39. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
40. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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right to jury trial in juvenile adjudications.4' The McKeiver Court
declined to constitutionally mandate trial by jury in juvenile adjudica-
tions, in part, because jury trials would introduce "the traditional
delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system" into the
already defective juvenile courts." The result is that, while the
United States Constitution is undoubtedly applicable in juvenile
proceedings, "the Constitution does not mandate [the] elimination of
all differences in the treatment of juveniles."4 Although this state-
ment refers to the United States Constitution, the same underlying
assumption that juvenile offenders are fundamentally different from
adult criminal defendants permeates the state courts' justifications for
denying juveniles the constitutional right to bail.
III. THE DENIAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL IN
JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
The constitutional right to bail in juvenile proceedings has been
considered in twelve states and the District of Columbia. In all but
two instances, an absolute right to bail has been denied.44 Thus, the
denial of juveniles' constitutional right to bail in Washington is not
without support.
A. The Denial of Bail in Washington State
The Washington Supreme Court has considered whether juveniles
have a right to bail on three separate occasions. The first case,
Packenham v. Reed,4" was decided in 1905 prior to the 1913 enact-
ment of Washington's Juvenile Court Law.46 The court's subsequent
decisions, State ex rel. Gray v. Webster47 and Estes v. Hopp,48 were
decided after the enactment of the Juvenile Court Law, when
Washington clearly adopted a parens patriae approach to juvenile
justice.49 Thus, it is not surprising that the Packenham court held
that juveniles charged with crimes have a right to bail pending appeal,
while the Gray and Estes courts rejected this right.
41. Id. at 545-51.
42. Id. at 545, 550.
43. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984). In Schall, the United States Supreme Court
resurrected the parens patriae doctrine to uphold the constitutionality of preventative detention
based on a prediction of future dangerousness. Id. at 281.
44. See infra notes 68, 81 and accompanying text.
45. 37 Wash. 258, 79 P. 786 (1905).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 125-127.
47. 122 Wash. 526, 211 P. 274 (1922).
48. 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 124-129.
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In Packenham, a ten-year-old boy was convicted of a crime under
a 1903 law and was sentenced to the state reform school until he
reached the age of eighteen. 0 The superior court denied bail pending
his appeal on the ground that children were not entitled to bail. l
The supreme court reversed, holding that "we have no doubt that an
infant, convicted of crime and committed to the reform school, has a
right of appeal ... and, incidentally, a right to be admitted to bail
pending the appeal." 2  However, the Packenham decision was not
based on a constitutional right to bail but on an interpretation of a
criminal statute that authorized bail pending appeal. s To support its
holding, the court stated: "So far as the courts are concerned, there
can be no distinction between the constitutional right to bail before
conviction and the statutory right to bail pending an appeal from a
judgment of conviction."5 4  The court's dicta suggests that in 1905
juveniles had a constitutional right to bail pending adjudication.
Seventeen years later, in Gray, a juvenile again challenged the
denial of bail pending the appeal of his commitment to a state training
school.55 The juvenile relied on the Packenham decision, but the
court rejected his claim. According to the court, bail was proper in
Packenham because the child in that case had been charged with an
offense for which there was a statutory right of appeal.5 6 In contrast,
the juvenile in Gray had been adjudged delinquent under the new
Juvenile Court Law, which provided that a finding of delinquency
"shall in no case be deemed a conviction of crime."57  Because the
juvenile in Gray was not charged with a crime, he had no right of
appeal under the criminal statutes or under article I, section 22 of the
Washington Constitution.58
Forty-five years later, the Washington Supreme Court was once
again called upon to consider a juvenile's right to bail. It was in 1968,
50. 37 Wash. at 258-59, 79 P. at 768.
51. See id. at 259, 79 P. at 768.
52. Id. at 260, 79 P. at 787.
53. The statute provided:
In all criminal actions, except capital cases in which the proof of guilt is clear or the
presumption great, upon an appeal being taken from the judgement of conviction, the
court in which the judgement was rendered, or a judge thereof, must.., determine the
amount of bail to be required of the appellant.
Id. at 259-60. 79 P. at 786.
54. Id. at 260, 79 P. at 787.
55. 122 Wash. at 527, 211 P. at 274.
56. Id. at 528, 211 P. at 274.
57. Id. at 529, 211 P. at 275.
58. Id. at 529-30, 211 P. at 275. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 provides in part that "[iun
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have .. .the right to appeal in all cases."
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an era now firmly entrenched in the parens patriae concept of juvenile
justice, that the Washington Supreme Court decided Estes v. Hopp. 9
Although the Gault decision, mandating application of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights to juvenile defendants, was decided
less than one year earlier, the Washington Supreme Court viewed
Gault as being limited to due process.6" Therefore, when considering
a juvenile's constitutional right to bail, the court stated that "[d]enying
a minor bail pending his appeal from a juvenile court order in no way
denies him the 'essentials of due process and fair treatment.' 61
The court further rejected the argument that juveniles have a
constitutional right to bail under article I, section 20 even though the
article states that "[a]ll persons charged with crimes shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties. '6 2 Employing the standard parens patriae rationale,
the court concluded that releasing a juvenile on bail "would in many,
if not most, cases be adverse to the minor's best interest and wel-
fare."6 3 The court also noted,
To allow a child judged delinquent or dependent to go free on bail,
pending appeal, would merely be returning him to the environment
which was the cause of his problems initially! Many times, in fact,
the delinquents really have nowhere to go. Most have come from
environments totally adverse to their best interests. There is no
guidance and nothing to do but return to their previous delinquent
behavior. By placing the child in a home or training school, he
receives the care and training he would not otherwise receive, and
contrary to the situation in some states, juveniles in Washington are
not to be detained in jail or confined with adult convicts.64
Ultimately, the court's decision rested, as it did in Gray, on its
conclusion that article I, section 20 applies only to criminal proceed-
ings.65 Because in 1968 the Juvenile Court Law provided that
59. 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968).
60. Id. at 269, 438 P.2d at 208-09.
61. Id. at 269, 438 P.2d at 209. Although this Comment addresses the issue of bail pending
adjudication and the Estes decision dealt specifically with bail pending an appeal, the substantive
distinction was not a factor in the Estes analysis.
62. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 20 (emphasis added).
63. Estes, 73 Wash. 2d at 269, 438 P.2d at 209.
64. Id. at 270, 438 P.2d at 209 (quoting respondent's brief). Given the Washington
Supreme Court's adoption of this language, it is interesting to note that the "child" in this case
was a 16-year-old girl who was arrested while in the company of her brother and her husband.
id. at 264, 438 P.2d at 205.
65. Id. at 269, 438 P.2d at 208.
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juvenile proceedings were not criminal in nature,66 there existed no
constitutional right to bail in juvenile proceedings in Washington.
B. The Denial of Bail in Other States
The Washington Supreme Court was not alone in its decision to
deny juveniles the constitutional right to bail. In fact, of the twelve
other jurisdictions that have considered whether juveniles have an
absolute, constitutional right to bail, 67 only two have recognized that
right.6"
The first and only court to recognize a state constitutional right
to bail was the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Franklin.69 The
Franklin court did so under Louisiana's Constitution of 1921, which
has a bail provision remarkably similar to that of Washington: "All
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except the following: 1.
Persons charged with a capital offense, where the proof is evident or
the presumption great. ' 7' Although Louisiana's juvenile court law
created a discretionary right to bail for minors under the age of
seventeen,71 the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: "It is axiomatic
that the Constitution must prevail over an act of the Legislature which
conflicts with it."'72  Echoing the fundamental justification for bail,
that a person is innocent until proven guilty,73 the court further stated
that "[a] finding of delinquency usually demonstrates the necessity for
66. See id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.240 (1974).
67. A state constitutional right to bail has been considered by the following states:
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey,
Ohio, and Texas. See infra notes 69 and 81. The District of Columbia has also considered
juveniles' right to bail, but it did so under the United States Constitution. See infra notes 75-76.
68. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960); State v. Franklin, 12 So. 2d 211
(La. 1943).
69. 12 So. 2d 211 (La. 1943). The Franklin court recognized juveniles' state constitutional
right to bail pending adjudication. Id. at 212; see also State v. Aaron, 390 So. 2d 208 (La. 1980);
State v. Hundley, 267 So. 2d 207 (La. 1972). But in Louisiana, juveniles' right to bail pending
appeal has been twice denied. See State v. Banks, 402 So. 2d 690, 694 (La. 1981) (holding that
the 1974 constitution delegated to the legislature the power to devise special juvenile procedures
pending appeal); State v. Clark, 173 So. 137, 138 (La. 1937) (denying bail pending appeal because
suspensive appeals were not available to juveniles under the constitution of 1921).
70. LA. CONST. of 1921 art. I, § 12 (emphasis added).
71. Franklin, 12 So. 2d at 212-13.
72. Id. at 213.
73. See Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical
Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 329 (1982) (stating that "[b]ail ... has for centuries been
the answer of the Anglo-American system of criminal justice to a vexing question: what is to be
done with the accused, whose guilt has not been proven, in the 'dubious interval,' often months
long, between arrest and final adjudication") (footnotes omitted).
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making a change in the custody of the child, but prior to such finding,
he is entitled to his constitutional right to bail. 74
In Trimble v. Stone,75 the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia also held that juveniles have a constitutional right
to bail pending adjudication, but the court did so under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.76 In an opinion that
anticipated the tenor of the Gault decision, 77 the Trimble court
expressly rejected the criminal-civil distinction that the Estes court used
to deny juveniles the right to bail:
The fact that [juvenile] proceedings are to be classified as civil
instead of criminal, does not, however, necessarily lead to the
conclusion that constitutional safeguards do not apply. It is often
dangerous to carry any proposition to its logical extreme. These
proceedings have many ramifications which cannot be disposed of
by denominating the proceedings as civil. Basic human rights do
not depend on nomenclature.7 1
In addition, the court rejected as unrealistic the characterization that
commitment of a juvenile to a state reformatory is solely for treatment
and not punishment. "All incarceration consequent on an infraction
of the law [whether in a reform school or a penitentiary] combines
deterrence, punishment, and treatment for rehabilitation in varying
degrees."79  Thus, the punitive-rehabilitative distinction between
adult and juvenile proceedings "does not bear the aspect of reality.""0
In spite of compelling arguments articulated by the Trimble and
Franklin courts, the majority of state courts have denied juveniles the
right to bail under their state constitutions. 81 As in Estes, the decision
74. Franklin, 12 So. 2d at 213.
75. 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960).
76. Id. at 484-86; cf. Banks, 402 So. 2d at 694-95 (holding that fundamental fairness under
the Due Process Clause, as articulated in Gault, mandates bail for juveniles pending adjudication).
Contra Pauley v. Gross, 574 P.2d 234, 237 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) ("The eighth amendment to the
federal constitution confers no right to bail on anyone, either adult or juvenile. It provides only
that bail shall not be excessive."); State v. Cromwell, 192 A.2d 775, 778 (Md. 1963) (holding that
"the failure to provide for bail in juvenile proceedings is not a violation of the Federal
Constitution").
77. The Trimble court anticipated Gault by stating that the "Constitution contains no age
limits." 187 F. Supp. at 486; see supra text accompanying note 31.
78. 187 F. Supp. at 485.
79. Id. at 486.
80. Id.
81. In re Magnuson, 242 P.2d 362, 364 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (denying bail pending
appeal); L.O.W. v. County of Arapahoe, 623 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Colo. 1981) (denying bail pending
adjudication); Cinque v. Boyd, 121 A. 678, 682-86 (Conn. 1923) (denying bail pending
adjudication and on appeal); In re Ort, 407 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (denying bail
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to reject the right to bail has been based on the parens patriae concept
of juvenile justice and the underlying notion that juvenile offenders are
not charged with crimes.
For example, in Baker v. Smith 2 and State ex rel. Peaks v.
Allaman,"3 the courts held that juveniles did not fit within the plain
language of their states' bail provisions and thus had no constitutional
right to bail. In Baker, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that
juveniles are not "prisoners" within the meaning of Kentucky's
constitutional provision governing bail. 4 The Kentucky Constitution
provides, in part, that "[ajll prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient
securities."85 The Baker court reasoned that the use of the word"prisoners" in the bail provision reflects the historical understanding
that bail is only applicable to persons charged with crimes.6 Bail is
granted to a person charged with a crime to "honor the presumption
of innocence."8 7
However, because the juvenile court is concerned with the welfare
of children and not with imposing punishment for criminal actions, the
court reasoned that juveniles do not have the same right to bail
afforded criminal defendants.8" Although a child's detention may
have the same practical effect upon his freedom as does the confine-
ment of an adult, the child's confinement is for his own welfare. 9 In
contrast, the pre-trial confinement of an adult criminal defendant is
used solely to ensure his presence at trial.90 Thus, in the juvenile
context, the state is merely exercising substituted parental control, and
the state's interest in the welfare of the child outweighs any curtailment
pending appeal); In re Pisello, 293 N.E.2d 228, 230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (denying bail
pending appeal); Pauley, 574 P.2d at 240 (denying bail pending adjudication); Baker v. Smith, 477
S.W.2d 149, 151 (Ky. 1971 ) (denying bail pending adjudication); Ex parte Newkosky, 116 A. 716,
717 (N.J. 1920) (denying bail pending adjudication); State ex rel. Peaks v. Allaman, 115 N.E.2d
849, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952) (denying bail pending adjudication); State v. Fullmer, 62 N.E.2d
268, 269 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945) (denying bail pending appeal); Espinosa v. Price, 188 S.W.2d 576,
576 (Tex. 1945) (denying bail pending appeal).
82. 477 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1971).
83. 115 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
84. 477 S.W.2d at 151-52.
85. Ky. CONST. § 16.
86. 477 S.W.2d at 150. To support its assertion that bail only applies in a criminal context,
the court indicated that bail does not extend to persons who are quarantined or to those who are
confined to mental institutions. Id. (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 151.
88. See id. at 150-51.
89. Id. at 150.
90. Id.
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of his freedom.9" The court also found it notable that the jurisdiction
of the Kentucky juvenile courts is not limited to those children charged
with committing public offenses, but also includes children who are
neglected, needy, or abandoned. 2 According to the court, under
Kentucky law there is no distinction between the types of "treatment"
that these two groups of children receive. 93  Therefore, juveniles
charged with public offenses are not "prisoners" and are not constitu-
tionally entitled to bail. 94
Similarly, the Allaman court interpreted Ohio's constitution to
limit the scope of its bail provision to adults.9" Article I, section 9 of
the Ohio Constitution provides: "Bailable offenses: of bail, fine, and
punishment. All persons shall be bailable, by sufficient sureties
"96 The Ohio Court of Appeals focused on the definition of the
word "offenses" to limit bail to adults.9  Because offenses are
synonymous with crimes and because juveniles in Ohio are not charged
with crimes, the court concluded that juveniles do not have a constitu-
tional right to bail.9" The court relied on a previous interpretation of
Ohio's Juvenile Court Act to demonstrate that juveniles are not
charged with crimes:
91. See id. at 150-51. The notion of "substituted parental control" is a common theme of
the parens patriae theory of juvenile justice. The idea that confinement of a juvenile to a state
institution is equal to or better than returning the juvenile to his home has been frequently
articulated. For example, in Schall v. Martin the United States Supreme Court stated,
The juvenile's .. .interest in freedom from institutional restraints ... must be
qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of
custody. Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of
themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if
parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae.
467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); see, e.g., In re Magnuson, 242 P.2d at 364; Pauley, 574 P.2d at 240.
92. Baker, 477 S.W.2d at 150.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 151-52.
95. 115 N.E.2d at 851.
96. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9.
97. Allaman, 115 N.E.2d at 850.
98. Id. at 850-51. In Espinosa, the Texas Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. 188
S.W.2d at 577. The Texas Constitution states that "[a]ll prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient
surieties, unless for capital offenses, when the proof is evident." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11. The
Espinosa court interpreted its bail provision as follows:
It will be readily observed that the language employed in the Constitution has
reference to criminal offenses and was not designed to apply in civil matters. Since
relators have been adjudged delinquent children and ordered restrained in a civil and
not a criminal proceeding, we are obliged here to apply rules of civil procedure rather
than rules governing the conduct of criminal cases. Accordingly, the quoted provision
of the State Constitution is not offended ....
188 S.W.2d at 577; see In re Magnuson, 242 P.2d at 364; Ex parte Newkosky, 116 A. at 717.
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The purpose of the statute is to save minors under the age of 17
years from prosecution and conviction on charges of misdemeanors
and crimes, and to relieve them from the consequent stigma
attaching thereto; to guard and protect them against themselves and
evil-minded persons surrounding them; to protect them and train
them physically, mentally and morally. . . . The statute is neither
criminal nor penal in its nature, but an administrative police
regulation.99
Unlike the Baker and Allaman courts, many states have avoided
a textual analysis of their constitutions' bail provisions and have simply
relied on the parens patriae concept of juvenile justice to deny bail.
Nevertheless, the themes expressed in these decisions are familiar: (1)
that bail only applies in criminal proceedings and that juveniles are not
charged with or convicted of crimes,' (2) that juveniles are not
punished by detention under the substituted parental control of the
juvenile courts,' and (3) that bail would corrupt the informal
character of juvenile proceedings. 2
The most common theme expressed is that juveniles are not
charged with crimes. For example, in Cinque v. Boyd,' 3 the court
looked to Connecticut's juvenile court act, which stated that "[n]o child
shall be prosecuted for an offense before a juvenile court, nor shall the
adjudication of such court that a child is delinquent ... be deemed a
conviction of crime. ' '  In a thoughtful analysis, the Cinque court
recognized that "an act does not become one solely of a civil nature
simply because it is called so, but it's [sic] true nature is to be
determined by the scope and nature of the provisions."' 0'  Yet, the
court denied the complaining juvenile's constitutional right to bail
based on the technical distinction between being charged with a
"violation," as opposed to the "offense" of petty theft.0 6 Bail was
99. Allaman, 115 N.E.2d at 851 (quoting Exparte Januszewski, 196 F. 123. 126 (S.D. Ohio
1911)).
100. E.g., In re Magnuson, 242 P.2d at 364; Cinque, 121 A. at 682-83; In re Ort, 407
N.E.2d at 1164; In re Pisello, 293 N.E.2d at 230; Pauley, 574 P.2d at 240; Baker, 477 S.W.2d at
151; Ex parte Newkosky, 116 A. at 717; Allaman, 115 N.E.2d at 850-51; Espinosa, 188 S.W.2d
at 577.
101. E.g., In re Magnuson, 242 P.2d at 364; Cinque, 121 A. at 681-82; In re Ort, 407
N.E.2d at 1164; In re Pisello, 293 N.E.2d at 230; Pauley, 574 P.2d at 238; Baker, 477 S.W.2d at
150; Ex parte Newkosky, 116 A. at 716.
102. L.O.W., 623 P.2d at 1258.
103. 121 A. 678 (Conn. 1923).
104. Id. at 681.
105. Id. at 683.
106. See id. at 684-85.
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denied because, if the juvenile was found to have committed the
violation, he would merely be declared "delinquent" and presumably
would not suffer the stigma of being convicted of a criminal of-
fense. 107
Similarly, in Pauley v. Gross,' the Kansas Court of Appeals
relied on the expressed legislative purpose behind the state's juvenile
code to deny juveniles the right to bail:
This act (juvenile code) shall be liberally construed, to the end that
each child coming within its provisions shall receive such care,
custody, guidance, control and discipline, preferably in the child's
own home, as will best serve the child's welfare and the best
interests of the state. In no case shall any order, judgment or decree
* . . be deemed or held to import a criminal act on the part of any
child. 109
Based on the civil-criminal distinction expressed in the code and the
fact that detention is employed only as a last resort, the court
concluded that "[d]etention in a juvenile proceeding ... cannot really
be said to be the equivalent of denial of bail for an adult."'10
In In re Magnuson.. and Ex parte Newkosky,"' the courts
focused on the nonpunitive character of juvenile detention. The
Magnuson court stated that "[t]he result of a declaration of wardship,
far from being a conviction of crime, is more in the nature of a
guardianship. 113  To equate such guardianship with imprisonment
is "to ignore the beneficent purposes of the law.""' 4  Similarly, the
Newkosky court held that its juvenile court act was "intended to save
young persons from the ordinary punishment for crime [and] from the
consequences of criminal conduct.""'  Because the juvenile court act
merely substitutes public control for parental control, the constitutional
right to bail does not apply to juveniles." 6
In L.O. W v. County of Arapahoe,"7 the Colorado Supreme
Court denied an absolute right to bail because it feared that the
institution of formal bail proceedings would corrupt the unique
107. See id. at 684.
108. 574 P.2d 234 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).
109. Id. at 238.
110. Id. at 240.
111. 242 P.2d 362 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
112. 116 A. 716 (N.J. 1920).
113. 242 P.2d at 364.
114. Id.
115. 116 A. at 716.
116. See id. at 716-17.
117. 623 P.2d 1253 (Colo. 1981).
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character of juvenile proceedings.11 According to the court, the
informal nature of the juvenile detention hearing gives juvenile court
judges the opportunity to consider a child's needs and welfare.'19
Although Colorado's bail provision grants an absolute right to bail in
all but capital cases, 2' the court noted that many rights afforded
adult criminal defendants are not extended to juveniles: "[T]he
protective purposes of juvenile proceedings preponderate over their
punitive function. '  The court also felt comfortable rejecting
juveniles' absolute right to bail because juvenile detention in Colorado
is limited to two narrowly defined circumstances: (1) protecting the
child from imminent harm, and (2) protecting the public from serious
bodily harm that the child is likely to inflict. 122
Whether engaging in a structured textual analysis or simply
relying on policy, each state court that has rejected the right to bail has
done so based on the parens patriae concept of juvenile justice. But as
was recognized in Kent, Gault, and Trimble, the benevolent parens
patriae approach may not always reflect the realities of juvenile
justice.1 23  Thus, while the civil-criminal and rehabilitative-punitive
distinctions may have been applicable in Kentucky, Ohio, Kansas,
California, Maryland, and Colorado, they are not applicable in
Washington in 1996. To understand why, it is necessary to examine
the transformation that has taken place in juvenile justice in Washing-
ton since the Estes decision.
IV. THE TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN
WASHINGTON STATE
A. The Historical Development
Washington's separate system of juvenile justice began much like
the systems in the rest of the nation. In 1905 and 1909, the state
enacted legislation that created "Juvenile Court session[s]" within the
superior courts.2 4  In 1913, the legislature enacted the Juvenile
Court Law,'25 which authorized courts to intervene on behalf of all
118. Id. at 1256.
119. Id. at 1257.
120. Id. at 1256.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 30-34, and 79-80.
124. 1905 Wash. Laws ch. 18, § 3, at 35 (repealed 1909); 1909 Wash. Laws ch. 190, §§ 1,
3, at 668-69 (repealed 1913).
125. 1913 Wash. Laws ch. 160, § 1, at 520 (substantially repealed by WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.04 (1977)).
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dependent and delinquent children'26 under the age of eighteen.
Firmly adopting a parens patriae approach, the legislature defined the
law's primary purpose as providing care, custody, and discipline for
delinquent and dependent children in a manner approximating that
which may or should be given by a parent. 2 7
Under the sweeping reforms of the 1913 Juvenile Court Law, no
child under the age of sixteen could be detained in an adult jail,
common lock-up, or police station. 2 ' Counties with more than fifty
thousand inhabitants were required to maintain separate juvenile
detention facilities "wherein all children within the provisions of [the]
act shall, when necessary, be sheltered.' 129
The Juvenile Court Law remained substantially unchanged for
nearly sixty-four years. 3  However, by the mid-1970s, growing
concerns about the increase in juvenile crime and the perception that
the juvenile court system was insensitive to public safety led critics of
the rehabilitative model to call for legislative reform. 3' A study
designed to assess these concerns concluded that the conflicting roles
126. Id. (defining delinquent and dependent children).
127. Id. § 14, at 530.
128. Id. § 11, at 529.
No court or magistrate shall commit a child under sixteen years of age to a jail, common
lock-up, or police station; but if such child is unable to give bail, it may be committed
to the care of the sheriff, police officer, or probation officer, who shall keep such child
in some suitable place or house or school of detention provided by the city or county,
outside the enclosure of any jail or police station, or in the care of any association willing
to receive it and having as one of its objects the care of delinquent, dependent or
neglected children.
Id.
129. Id. § 13, at 530.
130. The detention statute did experience significant modifications in 1961 and 1973. The
1961 amendment required that the child's parent or guardian be immediately notified whenever
a child was taken into custody. 1961 Wash. Laws ch. 302, § 2, at 2476. In addition, no child
could be held in a detention facility or shelter longer than 72 hours, excluding Sundays and
holidays, unless the prosecutor filed a petition. Id. Even if a petition was filed, the child had to
be released within 72 hours from the time of filing, unless a court order was issued authorizing
continued detention. Id. The maximum court-ordered detention was 30 days, although an
extension could be granted upon order from the juvenile court judge. Id. At each stage of
continued detention the court was required to enter findings upon which continued detention was
based. Id.
The 1973 amendment announced that '[a] child in need of detention either by reason of
assaultive conduct or because of probable failure to appear for further proceedings, shall . . . be
the responsibility of and provided for by the juvenile court." 1973 Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. ch.
101, § 1, at 710. This amendment appears to further place the juvenile court in a parental role
by removing children in detention from police custody or the supervision of a community shelter
not operated by the juvenile court.
131. Mary Kay Becker, Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction, 14 GONZ.
L. REV. 289, 293-95 (1979).
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of rehabilitation and punishment frustrated efforts to combat juvenile
crime.'32 The increase in juvenile crime was documented by the
number of admissions to juvenile institutions, which rose from 873 in
1960 to 1,539 in 1967.' The juvenile court's perceived lack of
concern for public safety was evidenced by case studies submitted to
the legislature. In one such example, a seventeen-year-old who was
found guilty of second degree murder was ordered to give fifty dollars
to charity and to perform one hundred hours of community ser-
vice. 134 In response to the public's concerns, the legislature passed
the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA),'3 5 which has been described
as "the most substantial reform of a state juvenile code that has
occurred anywhere in the United States.' ' 36
Under the JJA, the court is seen primarily as an "instrument of
justice rather than ... a provider of services.' 1 37  First, status
offenders-traditionally runaways and behaviorally disturbed, non-
criminal adolescents-were removed from the court system and
assigned to the Department of Social and Health Services for counsel-
ing and treatment. 138  Under this new division of responsibilities,
prosecutors and probation counselors became responsible for the intake
and screening of juveniles entering the court system. Second,
determinative sentencing guidelines were imposed to hold juveniles
accountable for their crimes. 13' Determinative sentencing removed
juvenile court judges' discretion by imposing statutory guidelines that
do not allow for consideration of a juvenile's social background or his
need for treatment. Instead, the sentencing scheme provides mandato-
ry punishment commensurate with the juvenile's age, crime, and
criminal history.'40 Third, the JJA's primary focus on accountability
is evidenced by its replacement of the term "delinquent" with the term"juvenile offender."'' Finally, juvenile hearings were opened to the
public, a practice previously thought to be injurious to youthful
offenders.'42
132. Id. at 299.
133. Id. at 293.
134. Id. at 294.
135. The JJA is currently codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40 (1994).
136. Ainsworth, supra note 21, at 1106 (citation omitted).
137. Becker, supra note 131, at 308.
138. Id.
139. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.0357 (1994).
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2)(d) (1994).
141. Becker, supra note 131, at 308.
142. Richard G. Patrick & Timothy T.A. Jensen, Changes in Rights and Procedures in
Juvenile Offense Proceedings, 14 GONZ. L. REV. 313, 315-16 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE
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Although the new juvenile code created a system based on
punishment, restitution, and accountability,1 3  the legislature has
been careful to indicate that the state retains a primary responsibility
for "being accountable for, and responding to the needs of youthful
offenders.""' As the following section illustrates, Washington courts
have generally deferred to the legislature's expressed purposes of
rehabilitation and punishment, while critical commentary has been
consistently less deferential.
B. Judicial and Critical Reaction to the JJA
The Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized the
JJA as promoting the twin purposes of rehabilitation and punish-
ment,14 while commentators have vigorously argued that the Act is
predominately punitive.'46  State v. Lawley'47 is indicative of the
court's characterization. Two years after Washington adopted the JJA,
a sixteen-year-old defendant who was denied the right to a jury trial
challenged the statute as violative of his due process rights.'48 The
juvenile argued that he was entitled to the same constitutional
protection given adult criminal defendants because the JJA's punitive
approach effectively transformed juvenile proceedings into criminal
prosecutions. 149  While recognizing that the legislature had "substan-
tially restructured" the juvenile system by mandating punishment, the
court denied the right to jury trial, concluding that "the legislature did
§ 13.40.140(6) (1994).
143. Becker, supra note 131, at 308.
144. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2) (1994). The declared co-equal purposes of the JJA
are: (a) to protect the citizenry from criminal behavior; (b) to determine whether accused
juveniles have committed offenses; (c) to make the juvenile offender accountable for criminal
behavior; (d) to provide for punishment commensurate with the juvenile's age, crime, and criminal
history; (e) to provide due process for juveniles alleged to have committed an offense; (f) to
provide necessary treatment, supervision, and custody for juvenile offenders; (g) to provide for
the handling of juvenile offenders by communities whenever consistent with public safety; (h) to
provide restitution to victims of crime; (i) to develop effective standards and goals for the
operation, funding, and evaluation of all components of the juvenile justice system; (j) to provide
for a clear policy to determine what types of offenders shall receive punishment, treatment, or
both. Id.
145. E.g., State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 9-10, 743 P.2d 240, 244 (1987); State v. Lawley,
91 Wash. 2d 654, 656-58, 591 P.2d. 772, 773 (1979).
146. E.g., Ainsworth, supra note 21, at 1106-09; Jeffrey K. Day, Comment, JuvenileJustice
in Washington: A Punitive System in Need of Rehabilitation, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 399,
416-27 (1992); Renee M. Willette, Comment, A Juvenile's Right Against Compelled Self-
Incrimination at Predisposition Proceedings, 69 WASH. L. REV. 305, 307-10 (1994). See generally
Becker, supra note 131, at 308.
147. 91 Wash. 2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979).
148. Id. at 656, 591 P.2d at 772.
149. Id.
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not intend to accuse, treat and sentence juveniles the same as adult
offenders."'' 0
Yet two years later, the same court held that the state's failure to
credit juveniles with time served in pre-adjudicatory detention was an
unconstitutional violation of due process.' Analogizing a juvenile's
time spent in detention to that of an adult criminal defendant, the
court saw no reason to deny juveniles the same constitutional protec-
tion accorded their adult counterparts.5 2 In reaching this conclusion,
the court uncharacteristically noted that under Washington law a
juvenile disposition order is punishment and "[t]he restrictions on a
person's liberties suffered by pretrial detention is [sic] no less
'punishment' than that imposed by the disposition order."'15 3
Critics of Washington's juvenile scheme have uniformly character-
ized it as punitive."' For example, Professor Janet Ainsworth used
Washington's "just desserts"'5 5 model to support her conclusion that
the separate juvenile court system should be abolished. 6 Relying
on social constructivist theory,'5 7 Professor Ainsworth identified
Washington's approach to juvenile justice as consistent with the "re-
imagining" of childhood and adolescence that has occurred in the later
half of the twentieth century.' According to Professor Ainsworth,
the modern conception of childhood views adolescence as a brief stage
in a continuum of fragmented life-stages.5 9  Consequently, the
150. Id. at 656, 591 P.2d at 773.
151. In re Trambitas, 96 Wash. 2d 329, 332-34, 635 P.2d 122, 123-24 (1981); cf. State v.
Cook, 37 Wash. App. 269, 271, 679 P.2d 413, 414 (1984) (holding that pretrial detention must
be credited toward community service hours imposed by disposition order).
152. In re Trambitas, 96 Wash. 2d at 332-34, 635 P.2d at 123-24.
153. Id. at 333, 635 P.2d at 124.
154. See sources cited supra note 146.
155. The "just desserts" model of juvenile justice is premised on "offender accountability"
and "punishment commensurate with the seriousness of the offense." CHAMPION, supra note 8,
at 26.
156. See Ainsworth, supra note 21, at 1106-07, 1118.
157. Social constructivist theory cannot be succinctly defined within the scope of this
Comment. For a description of Professor Ainsworth's interpretation of the theory, see id. at
1085-90. For a more general discussion, see PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966).
158. See Ainsworth, supra note 21, at 1101-07.
159. Professor Ainsworth argues that the distinctions made between life-stages such as
childhood, adolescence, young-adulthood, adulthood, middle-life, and old-age are less tied to
biological reality than to cultural, historical, and situational social construction:
The number of stages into which an individual's life is divided and the essential
qualities deemed characteristic of each stage in the life-cycle have varied over time and
across cultures. Indeed, the very concept that human lives pass through life-stages with
distinct characteristics has not always held the social and legal significance that it does
in the contemporary West.
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theory of a sharp dichotomy between childhood and adulthood used by
early reformers to justify a separate, rehabilitative juvenile court has
been superseded by a societal construction that blurs the distinction
between children and adults. 16  Through the use of determinative
sentences to hold juveniles accountable for their crimes, Washington's
punitive approach to juvenile justice reflects this modern construction
of childhood, a construction that assumes adolescent children possess
the cognitive and reasoning abilities that make them substantially
equivalent to adult criminal defendants. 161
Washington's juvenile system "exemplifies a rejection of both the
philosophy and practice of the traditional parens patriae juvenile
court." '162  While Washington's rejection of the parens patriae
philosophy is most clearly evidenced by its adoption of a determinative
sentencing scheme, Washington has also adopted most of the
procedural formality of adult criminal proceedings. For example,
juveniles, like adults, are charged by prosecutorial information; they are
governed by the same court rules during arraignment proceedings and
the rules of evidence at trial; they are entitled to notification of charges,
discovery, and the opportunity to be heard; they are allowed to cross-
examine witnesses; they have the right to counsel; and they are subject
to the same rules of joinder and severance.' 63 "Washington replaced
the intimate, informal proceeding in which the judge might 'put his
arm around [a boy's] shoulder and draw the lad to him' with proce-
dures that, with [the exception of jury trial], precisely mirror those of
the adult criminal trial."' 64  Washington's adoption of this punitive
and formalistic approach to juvenile justice calls for the reassessment
of a juvenile detainee's right to bail.
The definition of childhood-who is classified as a child, and what emotional,
intellectual, and moral properties children are assumed to possess-has changed over
time in response to changes in other facets of society.
Id. at 1092-93 (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 1101-03. Just as the early reformers justified the separate juvenile court system
based on their reconstruction of adolescence ass subcategory of childhood, today's juvenile justice
reformers have once again reconfigured childhood. Id. at 1101-02. "From [today's] vantage
point, adolescence [does] not seem to have any intrinsic and invariant characteristics. Nor [do]
the young appear to be as inherently and essentially different from adults as formerly [has] been
assumed." Id. at 1102-03 (citation omitted).
161. See id. at 1103.
162. Id. at 1106.
163. Id. at 1108.
164. Id. (citations omitted).
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V. WHY JUVENILES SHOULD HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO BAIL
A. The Realities of Juvenile Detention
The Washington Legislature has stated that "[i]t is the policy of
this state that all county juvenile detention facilities provide a humane,
safe, and rehabilitative environment and that unadjudicated youth
remain in the community whenever possible, [so long as release is]
consistent with public safety . , Under Wash. Rev. Code
§ 13.40.040, the court may detain a pre-adjudicated juvenile whenever
there is probable cause to believe that he has committed an offense and
he meets one of the following criteria: (1) he will likely fail to appear
for further proceedings; (2) he may be a danger to himself, (3) he is a
threat to community safety; (4) he will intimidate witnesses or
otherwise unlawfully interfere with the administration of justice; or (5)
he committed a crime while another case was pending.'66 In the
juvenile context, an offense can be anything from homicide to
disorderly conduct. 6 7
Adult criminal defendants are also subject to detention under
similar conditions. 16  However, under both article I, section 20 and
the criminal court rules, adults have an affirmative right to bail in
noncapital cases. An adult defendant who is detained in jail "must be
taken or required to appear before the superior court as soon as
practicable after the detention is commenced, ... but in any event
before the close of business on the next judicial day."' 69  The adult
criminal defendant "shall at the preliminary appearance ... be ordered
released on [his] personal recognizance pending trial unless" he is a
flight risk or presents a danger to society. 70
In contrast, a juvenile can be detained for as long as six to twelve
days before his preliminary appearance,' 7' and his right to bail is
165. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.038 (1994).
166. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.040(2)(a)(i)-(v) (1994). A juvenile may also be held
in detention if he is a fugitive, if his parole has been modified or suspended, or if he is a material
witness. Id. § 13.40.040(2)(b)-(d).
167. An offense is an "act designated a violation or a crime if committed by an adult under
the law of this state .. " WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.020(19) (1994).
168. See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2.
169. WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2B(a)(1).
170. WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(a) (emphasis added).
171. The juvenile detention hearing is the equivalent of the preliminary appearance in an
adult criminal proceeding. When a juvenile is taken into custody after a warrantless arrest, he
must be released within three days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, unless an
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discretionary. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.040(4) states that "[a] juvenile
... may be released upon posting a probation bond set by the
court. ' 172  Thus, the affirmative right to bail evidenced by the use of
the word "shall" in both article 1, section 20 and the criminal court
rules has been modified by the discretionary word "may" in the
juvenile context. The Washington State Judges' Benchbook on
Juvenile Procedures indicates the discretionary nature of bail in juvenile
proceedings: "An unresolved question is whether a juvenile may be
held in continued detention without the opportunity for release upon
the posting of a bond.' 73
A common assumption may be that the right to bail is unneces-
sary in juvenile proceedings because the duration of detention is
limited. This assumption is inaccurate. In Washington, a juvenile
may be lawfully detained for up to fifty days without an adjudication
of guilt.'74 But a study commissioned by the Governor's Juvenile
Justice Advisory Committee indicated that actual periods of detention
may be even longer. The Detention Study found that the average
length of time that a juvenile was held after a detention hearing varied
widely from county to county.'75  For those counties reporting,1 76
information is filed. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.050(1)(a) (1994); WASH. JUV. CT. R. 7.3(c).
A detention hearing must be held within three days from the date of filing of the information,
excluding weekends and holidays, or from the time that the juvenile is taken into custody if a
warrant was issued prior to arrest. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.050(1)(b) (1994); WASH. JUV. CT.
R. 7.3 (c)-(d). Although Washington's juvenile court rules suggest every reasonable effort should
be made to conduct a detention hearing within 24 hours after the juvenile is taken into custody
or an information is filed, the statutory language allows for considerably more flexibility and
delay: A juvenile who is taken into custody based on a warrant must be given a detention hearing
within three to six days, whereas a juvenile taken into custody without a warrant may be held for
as long as six to twelve days before a detention hearing must be held. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.40.050(1)(a)-(b) (1994).
172. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.040(4) (1994) (emphasis added).
173. JUDGES' BENCHBOOK COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON STATE JUDGES' BENCHBOOK
JUVENILE PROCEDURE § 21.7, at V-22 (2d ed. 1988).
174. When a juvenile is held in detention, an adjudicatory hearing must be held within 30
days of his arraignment in juvenile court. WASH. JUV. CT. R. 7.8(b). The arraignment must be
held within 14 days after the filing of the information. WASH. JUV. CT. R. 7.6(a). When a
juvenile is detained after a warrantless arrest, an information need not be filed for 72 hours,
excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, from the time that the juvenile is taken into custody.
See WASH. JUV. CT. R. 7.3(c). Thus, a juvenile could be taken into custody on a Wednesday
and held over a three day weekend before the prosecutor is required to file an information.
Fourteen more days may pass before his arraignment must be held. Because his adjudicatory
hearing need not be held until 30 days after the arraignment, the juvenile could be held in
detention for up to 50 days.
175. COLUMBIA INFORMATION SYSTEMS, WASHINGTON STATE JUVENILE DETENTION
STUDY 50-51 (1985) [hereinafter DETENTION STUDY].
176. Although there are 18 detention facilities in Washington, only 10 are represented in
the study due to either statistical incompatibility or lack of available data. Id. at 11.
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the average number of days that a juvenile was held in pre-adjudicato-
ry detention was 37.177 The lowest average was 16 days in Walla
Walla and Yakima Counties; the highest was 124 days in Mason
County.178  King and Pierce Counties, the most populous and due
process-oriented counties in the state, both reported a 45 day pre-
adjudicatory detention average. 179
Another assumption may be that juveniles do not need bail
because they are not held in adult lock-ups or jails.80 While Wash-
ington has been successful in removing juveniles from adult jails,'8 '
the conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities are as frightening
and dangerous as confinement in an adult jail. Washington's use of
determinative sentencing has created overcrowded facilities where pre-
adjudicated juveniles are frequently housed with convicted offend-
ers.1 2  In fact, the state defines a detention facility as "a county
facility ... for the ... confinement of a juvenile alleged to have
committed an offense or an adjudicated offender. "183 Reports
confirm that convicted offenders are regularly housed in the King
County Detention Center: In 1988, 1989, and 1990, 23 percent of the
total population consisted of adjudicated offenders.' In addition,
12 of the 18 county detention facilities contract with the state to house
177. Id. at 50-51.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 128-129.
181. Although the removal of children from adult jails and lock-ups was mandated by the
1913 Juvenile Court Law, children in Washington continued to be confined in these facilities,
particularly in rural areas that lacked detention facilities. See GOVERNOR'S JUVENILE JUSTICE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT 189 (1994). But this practice has been
significantly reduced in recent years, due primarily to the Federal Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act. See id. The Act, which ties state funding to compliance with its
provisions, requires the removal of juveniles from adult jails with a few limited exceptions: A
juvenile may not be detained in an adult facility for more than 24 hours unless a detention facility
is not immediately available, and only if the juvenile is separated by sight and sound from adults
prisoners. Washington codified the federal provisions in 1985, see WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.04.116 (1994), and has subsequently achieved considerable success in maintaining
compliance. On-site inspections in 1993 revealed that only 14 juveniles in the state were held in
adult jails, compared to the 200 juveniles who were so detained in 1983. Compare GOVERNOR'S
JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT 189 (1994) with
GOVERNOR'S JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT 58
(1984).
182. See GOVERNOR'S JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, JUVENILES JUSTICE
REPORT 160 (1994); KING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES, 1991 ANNUAL
REPORT 14 (1992); see also infra text accompanying notes 184-203.
183. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.020(11) (1994) (emphasis added).
184. KING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 14
(1992).
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convicted offenders when the state's correctional facilities are over-
crowded. 8
In 1990, the King County Detention Center became so crowded
that a class-action lawsuit was filed on behalf of juveniles in that
facility. The juveniles alleged that they were subjected to physical and
psychological harm due to overcrowding" 6 and that the size of the
detention staff was inadequate to handle the population. 7 At trial,
several detainees testified that they had been physically and sexually
assaulted. 88 The facility, originally designed to house 71,1"' had
an average daily population of 120 juveniles. 9 ' Many of the assaults
occurred in six-person dormitories, where "one kid [would watch] the
door, so two others [could] hold down another boy."'' Based on
this evidence, the judge limited the center's population to 112 juveniles
by imposing a two-youth-per-room limit.19 2  Despite the logistical
problems of instituting his order, the judge stated that "the need for
detention does not override the rights of children to be safe and
secure."' 193
Overcrowding caused similar problems at the Spokane County
Juvenile Detention Center where two detainees tried to commit
suicide. 4 Within weeks of each other, the two boys-a fifteen-year-
old and a sixteen-year-old-were found unconscious after they tried to
hang themselves with bedsheets. The director of the county's juvenile
court system declared an "immediate crisis" due to the overcrowd-
ing. 195 During the week of the second suicide attempt, 61 juveniles
were detained in the facility, even though the American Correctional
Association standards suggested a maximum of 42.196
185. See DETENTION STUDY, supra note 175, at 76-127. The counties that contract with
the state are Benton, Chelan (diagnostic only), Clark, Grant, Grays Harbor, Pierce, Skagit,
Snohomish, Spokane, Thurston, Whatcom, and Yakima. Clallam, Cowlitz, King, Kitsap, Lewis,
and Okanogan Counties did not provide these services.
186. See Day, supra note 146, at 424.
187. Id.
188. Don Carter, County Ordered to Cut Crowding at Youth Center, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 17, 1991, at Al.
189. Day, supra note 146, at 425.
190. Carter, supra note 188, at A4.
191. Id. at Al (quoting ACLU attorney John Phillips).
192. Id.
193. Bob Lane & Richard Seven, Judge Sets Limit at Two Youths Per Cell, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 16. 1991, at El.
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Most recently, seven juveniles, four of them adjudicated offenders,
were transferred out of the King County Detention Center after a staff
member was injured during a gang fight.197 All seven had been
waived to adult court based upon the serious nature of their alleged
crimes;' 9' nevertheless, they were housed in the King County facility
during trial or while awaiting sentencing. 99 Each of the juveniles
had a history of threatening staff members with bodily harm, partici-
pating in gang activity, and engaging in aggressive behavior within the
institution. 200  Although juveniles who are prosecuted as adults
account for fewer than one-tenth of the 160 juveniles held at the
detention center,- they create serious problems for the detention
staff. In a facility that is not designed to handle long-term detainees,
these violent juveniles stay months longer than any other detainee and,
ultimately, "have nothing to lose. ' 2 2  In the most glaring example,
one of the juveniles had already been sentenced to fifty-two years in
prison for a fatal gang-related shooting; yet, he remained in the
juvenile facility while the state determined where he would serve his
sentence.203
The realities of juvenile detention in Washington-lengthy
incarceration, overcrowding, attempted suicides, and violence-suggest
that the Estes vision of the parens patriae juvenile court, applied today,
is at best naive and at worst disingenuous. In the twenty-seven years
since the Estes decision, our society has adopted a different conception
of childhood and children's culpability. Today, we hold children
accountable for their crimes, focusing on punishment rather than
rehabilitation. Given this shift in focus, the juvenile system is more
197. Diedtra Henderson, Juvenile Criminals Now Held with Adults; Near-Riot at Detention
Center Injures Staff Member, Causes Judge to Approve Relocation, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 16, 1995,
at Al.
198. Id. The four adjudicated offenders included: Brian Ronquillo, a 17-year-old who shot
and killed a girl in front of her high school; Sanfey Feui "Fish" Saephan, a 16-year-old who
stabbed a rival gang member in the head with a screwdriver; Chan Poo "Shampoo" Saetern, a 17-
year-old who kicked and beat two victims; and Jeremy Santiago, a 17-year-old who pleaded guilty
to robbery. Id. Ronquillo had already been sentenced to 52 years in prison, while the other three
adjudicated offenders were awaiting sentencing. The remaining three juveniles who were held
pending trial were: Royce "Little Scrappy" Hendrix, a 15-year-old accused of killing a young girl
in a drive-by shooting; Tony "T.C." Combs, a 1 5-year-old who allegedly drove the vehicle in the
drive-by shooting of the young girl; and Robert Veneagas Mena, a 17-year-old accused of severely





203. Id. This is the case of Ronquillo. See supra note 198.
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akin to the adult system, and juveniles should, therefore, receive the
same constitutional right to bail afforded their adult counterparts.
B. Refuting the Parens Patriae Justification For Denying Bail
Given the overwhelming precedent against granting a constitution-
al right to bail in juvenile proceedings, a plain language argument
based on the language, "all persons charged with crime shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties" would obviously fail. However, a plain
language argument coupled with an understanding of the transforma-
tion that has occurred in juvenile justice in Washington strongly
supports the conclusion that the constitutional right to bail should be
granted.
The predominant theme in state court decisions denying the
constitutional right to bail is the civil-criminal distinction that juveniles
are not charged with crimes and, therefore, are not equivalent to adult
criminal defendants. 24  The court in State ex rel. Peaks v. Allaman
relied on the word "offense" in the Ohio Constitution to deny juveniles
the right to bail.205 Similarly, the Baker v. Smith court excluded
juveniles from the right to bail because they are not "prisoners" within
the meaning of the Kentucky Constitution. 20 6  And, in Pauley v.
Gross, the Kansas court relied on the purpose of the state's juvenile
code to establish that juvenile offenders are not charged with
207crimes.
In Washington, these arguments are without merit. First, article
I, section 20 of the Washington Constitution provides that bail applies
only to "persons charged with crime. "208 Yet, in Washington, a
juvenile can be detained whenever he has committed an "offense. 209
And, an offense is defined as "an act designated a violation or a crime
if committed by an adult under the laws of this state. "210
Second, the framers of the Washington Constitution rejected a
motion to limit the bail provision to "prisoners" and, instead, included
the language "all persons. 211  Therefore, the framers of Washing-
204. See supra text accompanying notes 100-110.
205. 115 N.E.2d 849, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
206. 477 S.W.2d 149, 151-52 (Ky. 1991).
207. 574 P.2d 234, 240 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).
208. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 20.
209. See supra text accompanying note 166.
210. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.020(19) (1994) (emphasis added).
211. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
1889, at 509 (Beverly P. Rosenow ed., 1962).
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ton's Constitution can be said to have included all citizens, including
juveniles, within the scope of the bail provision.
Finally, unlike the Kansas code, the Washington code cites among
its many purposes that it is designed: (1) to protect citizens from
criminal behavior; (2) to make the juvenile offender accountable for his
criminal behavior; (3) to provide for punishment commensurate with
the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender; and (4) to
provide for restitution to victims of crime. 12 Based on the above
language, when the Washington Legislature revised the juvenile code
in 1977, it clearly intended to charge juveniles with crimes. Thus, in
Washington there is little basis for the argument that a juvenile is not
a "person charged with crime" within the plain language of article I,
section 20.
In In re Magnuson and Ex parte Newkosky, the courts used the
punitive-rehabilitative distinction to deny juveniles the constitutional
right to bail. 23  The rationale of these courts is that the state is
exercising substituted parental control and that to equate juvenile
detention with punishment fails to take into account the "beneficent
purposes of the [juvenile court] law."214  This argument is also
without merit in Washington because Washington has clearly adopted
a "just desserts" model of juvenile justice i.21  This model does not
reject rehabilitation and treatment but places its primary emphasis on
accountability and punishment. 16 Washington's adoption of this
model is most clearly reflected in its implementation of determinative
sentencing. Because determinative sentencing provides mandatory
punishment commensurate with the juvenile's age, crime, and criminal
history, the parens patriae notion of a beneficent juvenile court judge
no longer exists. Determinative sentencing takes away the juvenile
court judge's traditional flexibility to act in the best interest and
welfare of the child.
Washington's emphasis on punishment is also reflected in the
removal of status offenders from the juvenile court system. 17 While
the training schools in 1968 may have been places where runaways and
other non-criminal adolescents "receive the care and training [they]
212. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2) (1994).
213. In re Magnuson, 242 P.2d 362, 364 (D. Cal. 1952); Ex parte Newkosky, 116 A. 716,
716 (N.J. 1920).
214. See In re Magnuson, 242 P.2d at 364.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 137-142, 155-162.
216. CHAMPION, supra note 8, at 26.
217. See supra text accompanying note 138.
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would not otherwise receive" at home,21 today's juvenile detention
facilities house only juvenile offenders. Thus, juveniles charged with
crimes are housed in environments that are increasingly more
dangerous and that hardly substitute for the safety of juveniles' own
homes. 9 This is not to say that juvenile offenders do not receive
treatment within Washington's detention facilities, but, as was
recognized in Trimble v. Stone, all incarceration, whether in a detention
center or a penitentiary, combines varying degrees of punishment,treatment, and rehabilitation.22 Because the Washington Legislature
has chosen to emphasize punishment, juveniles should not be denied
the absolute right to bail.
The L. 0. W v. County of Arapahoe court expressed fear that the
imposition of a constitutional right to bail in juvenile proceedings
would frustrate the unique character of the juvenile courts. 22' As
Professor Ainsworth indicates, this type of reasoning is faulty. The
procedural formality that the L.O. W court feared is already present in
Washington's formalistic approach to juvenile justice.222 Juveniles
have been afforded all of the constitutional protections characteristic of
adult criminal proceedings, except the right to jury trial. Why should
the right to bail be any different? Juveniles are subject to formalized
procedures at every stage of the proceedings, yet the discretionary right
to bail remains one of the last vestiges of the parens patriae juvenile
court.
Finally, there is an historical basis for granting juveniles the right
to bail. Washington's constitution was enacted in 1889, yet the
separate juvenile court system was not fully implemented in Washing-
ton until 1913.223 Prior to the 1913 enactment of the Juvenile Court
Law, the parens patriae system of juvenile justice did not exist in
Washington. Thus, when article I, section 20 of the state's constitu-
tion was enacted, juveniles were subject to the same criminal laws and
sanctions as were adults. Juveniles were likely given the same right to
bail as their adult counterparts. This conclusion is reflected in the
Packenham v. Reed224 and State ex rel. Gray v. Webster25 decisions.
In Packenham, a juvenile was granted the same statutory right to bail
218. Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 263, 270, 438 P.2d 205, 209 (1968).
219. See supra section V.A.
220. 187 F. Supp. 483, 486 (D.D.C. 1960).
221. 623 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Colo. 1981).
222. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
224. 37 Wash. 258, 79 P. 786 (1905).
225. 122 Wash. 526, 211 P. 274 (1922).
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that adults received, but Packenham was decided prior to the enactment
of the Juvenile Court Law. After Washington adopted the parens
patriae approach to juvenile justice, the Gray court denied juveniles the
same statutory right to bail because they no longer had a constitutional
right to appeal an adjudication of delinquency.226
A constitution is not a static document, but should change over
time to be constitutive of the people it represents. As Washington's
system of juvenile justice moves away from parens patriae principles
and back toward its constitutional origins, juveniles should be returned
to their former status as "persons charged with crime," and the right
to bail should once again be extended to juveniles, as citizens of Wash-
ington.
VI. CONCLUSION
As our system of juvenile justice moves away from rehabilitation
and demands accountability and retribution from our children, we are"re-imagining" our conception of childhood. This re-imagining
reflects the common law conception of children as being capable of
acting responsibly and accepting responsibility for their actions.
Washington State has clearly adopted such a conception."' As a
result, the Washington Supreme Court's depiction of juvenile justice
in Estes v. Hopp. neither reflects nor defines the realities of juvenile
justice in Washington State in 1996. Yet, the legacy of the Estes
decision lingers in the denial of juveniles' state constitutional right to
bail in Washington's otherwise formal and punitive system of juvenile
justice. Washington juveniles do not have an absolute right to bail, a
procedural safeguard that is designed to "honor the presumption of
innocence, "22' because they are perceived not to be charged with
crimes or punished by the juvenile court. Yet, they are incarcerated
for long periods of time in a system that mirrors the realities of adult
prison life.23°
As we move back to a common law conception of childhood, the
parens patriae justification for denying bail no longer exists. Therefore,
the Washington Supreme Court should reconsider its denial of bail by
reviewing the language of article I, section 20 in light of the realities of
juvenile justice in 1996.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 137-142, 155-164.
228. 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968).
229. See supra text accompanying note 87.
230. See supra section V.A.
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